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A Public Manager What I Wish I'd
Looks Back: Been Taught
Dan H. Fenn
The author, a practitioner-teacher ofpublic administration, writes that the special context
ofgovernment in the United States, whetherfederal, state, or local, needs to be specifi-
cally explored by schoolsfor would-be public managers. The constitutionally established
system offractionatedpower at once makes governmentjobs extraordinarily difficult and
provides great opportunitiesfor those who see themselves as partners in the policy-making
process and want to put their stamp on the events oftheir times. Despite the view ofthe
general public
,
government is made to orderfor entrepreneurs who are adept at accreting
and maintainingpower regardless ofthe organizational level at which they are operating.
Specifically, public managers need a solid grounding in the liberal arts; a systematic way
ofunderstanding and analyzing the various independentpower centers that shape public
policy; the ability to analyze and control their managerial style so it willfit a system that
operates more through accommodation than direction; and exposure to the body oftheo-
retical and practical knowledge now being assembled about the process ofnegotiation
through which public policy is made.
This article is based on the Wohlman Distinguished Lecture that was presented by the
author at Baruch College, City University ofNew York, in October of1982.
Thirty-five years of public service which have taken me from the Lexington Town
Meeting to the White House and back again, reinforced by a like period spent teach-
ing in a wide variety of graduate management programs, have generated some personal
observations on the training of public managers. I offer these observations not as a
scholar, despite the years I have spent as a teacher, but rather as a practitioner whose
teaching and writing have served to enrich workaday experiences in appointed and even in
some minor elective offices.
In thinking about this topic, I am concerned more with the context within which public
management courses are presented than with any specific curriculum. An understanding
of the nature and shape and underlying realities of the public sector in this unique Ameri-
can H. Fenn is assistant to the chancellor at the University ofMassachusetts at Boston. Formerly, he was staff
assistant to President John F Kennedy, vice-chairman ofthe U.S. TariffCommission, and director ofthe John F
Kennedy Library.
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can system is far more important than knowledge of statistics and budgeting and quantita-
tive analysis, significant as that material may be.
What, I have been asking myself, do I wish I had understood when I began working in
this field; what do I wish I knew or knew how to do better or more systematically today?
Looking back, what do I wish my various bosses had known so that my jobs would have
gone more smoothly?
The ideas that follow are directed at those who are concerned with the preparation and
training of public managers at all levels and in all jurisdictions, whether state, local, or
federal. (There are differences, of course, and they are important ones, but the similari-
ties across levels and jurisdictions are far more meaningful, in my experience, than the
dissimilarities.) I underscore the word managers because government, like industry and
the so-called third sector (nonprofits), includes thousands of women and men whose re-
sponsibilities are essentially staff in nature, people who spend their days researching,
analyzing, observing, evaluating, and recommending for those who have the ultimate
decision-making authority. Or, to be more precise and to avoid the endless arguments over
the differences at the margin between staff people and line people, I am concerned with
the managerial portions of a person's job, however the position description may read or
the lines may be drawn on the organization chart.
Happily, we seem now to have passed through the time when, in the public sector, the
term manager was almost one of approbrium. In Washington during the 1960s, the federal
service was presumed to be separated into two classes, and unequal ones at that. The
managers were considered a lower order—glorified clerks really, whose jobs were made
up of the mundane, technical, and essentially irrelevant pursuits of procurement, budget-
ing, and personnel administration. The "serious, important" people in town were called
"policymakers." I remember one assistant secretary of state who proclaimed with some
pride that he did not care about the budget or personnel matters in his division; after all,
his job was to make Far Eastern policy.
The misguided notion that one can "make policy" without accepting the responsibilities
of "management" was imbedded in the first Hoover Commission Report, which led to the
establishment of permanent assistant secretaries for administration in the Cabinet depart-
ments, people who stayed in their jobs from administration to administration. 1 This plan
served the interests of the career civil service and of the internal politics of that system
and the people in it far better than it served the concerns of those charged with establish-
ing and running federal programs. We have now come to realize, as the business commu-
nity always did, that the notion that one can determine and effectuate a program or a
policy without managing the funds and people involved is a dangerous myth.
With this realization has come an increasing interest in the training of those people who
will take on the responsibility of running public agencies and programs—people whose
job it is to make things happen—along with the consequent growth of courses in manage-
ment and in policy analysis.
Liberal Arts Education Is Needed
As I ponder this matter of education for public management, I find myself increasingly
convinced that the proper setting is in graduate schools or executive programs for practic-
ing officials— not the undergraduate level. There is no substitute on the job for a solid
grounding in the liberal arts, a total immersion in the disciplines of the social sciences and
the humanities, for the would-be government official.
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For one thing, there are the lessons of history, and the nonlessons. Profs. Ernest R.
May and Richard E. Neustadt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government have
reminded us that too many policy disasters have been constructed, or at least rationalized,
on the basis of a misreading of precedents. 2 The fact is that the situation confronting
Chamberlain in dealing with Hitler at Munich bore a minimal resemblance to the one
faced in the 1950s and 1960s by U.S. policymakers working with the complexities of the
incursions and instigated uprisings by North Vietnam in South Vietnam. But the impor-
tance of understanding the roots of problems and the efforts to deal with them in the
past— the sensitivity to the differences between situations as well as the similarities— is
too obvious to be worth belaboring here. A liberal arts education, it is hoped, can contrib-
ute to this kind of sensitive reading of the historical lessons.
Further, a sense, a tasting, of the enduring complexities of humankind and human rela-
tions, whether provided by Shakespeare, the Bible, or the world's great novels, is indis-
pensable to the man or woman who aspires to work successfully and effectively in the real
world. The public manager labors every minute of every day with the volatile stuff of
human emotions: desires, aspirations, sensitivities, jealousies, fears, ambivalences, de-
pendencies.
Finally, the central and enduring questions of politics and political theory should be so
ingrained in the public manager that they come to the surface intuitively. Whether it is the
implications of "Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" ("But who is to guard the guards
themselves?") or Burke on the role of the representative or Hamilton and Jefferson wres-
tling with the issue of efficiency versus responsiveness in a free society or the sensitivity
of the founding fathers to unintended consequences— to secondary and tertiary effects—
as well as their decent regard for posterity, the public manager's Weltanschauung needs to
be formed in terms of basic premises and realities and dilemmas. Automatically, when
someone says "cost/benefit analysis," she should think, "Whose costs and whose bene-
fits?" Intuitively she should be alert to the havoc of a Torquemada, a Savonarola, or a Joe
McCarthy when someone self-righteously uses terms likepatriotic and morality and phrases
like "the right thing to do" and "Americanism and the American Way" as policy yard-
sticks. John Adams proclaimed a government of laws, not men; the aspiring public man-
ager needs to view that sentiment with a ready skepticism, a full understanding that
statutes and procedures do not control great events but people do, albeit within the broad
framework established by our laws and Constitution. Even Murphy's law, which states that
if something can go wrong, it will, needs to be a part of the manager's thought processes.
To stint lessons such as these, to miss the sophomore bull sessions on the meaning of
justice and the role of God in history in order to concentrate on the public budgeting pro-
cess or on the workings of the state civil service system in Minnesota is to do the prospec-
tive public manager and the society at large a severe disservice.
Three Basic Premises
In my view, an effective and relevant program in public management should be based on
three premises:
1
.
Public-sector jobs are inordinately difficult, more so than those in any
other sector.
2. All public managers are, to varying degrees, policymakers, not merely
people who implement policy.
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3. A government position is a hunting license, not a precisely defined
charter.
The Difficulty ofPublic-Sector Jobs
Government management jobs are extremely challenging. They are difficult because they
deal with complex issues, often highly technical in nature, where decisions must be made
in the face of limited and undeveloped data. They are difficult because the framers of the
U.S. Constitution consciously set out to fractionate political power, thus making the im-
plementation of policy very complicated. And they are difficult because they frequent-
ly involve the resolution of problems where the "right" and the "ought" are on both sides
of the question, so the decision comes down to which "right" (or which "wrong") one is
going to favor.
Unfortunately, prevailing public attitudes toward government jobs do not conform to
this fact. Rather, Americans hold curiously inconsistent views on this matter, as on so
many others. We seem to assume that running programs in the public sector is easy, while
the challenge of manufacturing and selling lemon-scented furniture polish is really
tough. 3 At the same time, we seem to believe that the government, as opposed to the furni-
ture polish business, is a managerial disaster.
I say inconsistent because, logically, if running a government were easy, if anyone could
do it, government could not be a mess. The way we reconcile the inconsistency is, inci-
dentally, both intriguing and ingenious: we employ a kind of intellectual alchemy that
magically transforms the best and the brightest into the village idiot the minute she or he
accepts a government post, elected or appointed! (Yet we bemoan the fact that so many
good people eschew the public service, and look back in fond recollection to the days of
Camelot.)
The assumption that government jobs are simple is not a phenomenon of the 1980s.
Both the spoils system and the civil service reform movement that it spawned at the end of
the last century were based on the premise that government jobs are relatively easy, that
virtually anyone can accomplish them and that consequently they do not demand any
special training or experience. The theoretical underpinning of the spoils system was that
in a people's democracy, government offices should be manned by the people. Civil serv-
ice reform rested on the premise that there are no generalized managerial skills and no
expertise peculiar to the public sector: that government jobs are merely a collection of
special tasks such as loan officer or real estate appraiser or lawyer or engineer or econo-
mist which are completely interchangeable with similar jobs in the private sector. In
marked contrast to the British system, therefore, we have a program that ostensibly en-
courages lateral entry from outside the career ranks.
To be sure, lateral entry is an idea that, at least at the federal level, has never really
worked except for discrete groups like scientists and lawyers. The intake from the outside,
into the career system at other than the entering grade (as opposed to noncareer "politi-
cal" appointments), is minuscule. But on paper, at least, the system places no particular
premium on experience in the public sector as a qualification for appointment.
This pervasive view that government is easy to manage produces some specific unfortu-
nate results. For one thing, we continue to succumb to simplistic solutions for complex
managerial problems. In Carter's time, the quick fix was reorganization. In Johnson's it
was the Planning and Programming Budget System; in Nixon's it was central control from
the White House and the Ash Commission's recommendations. Now it's staff reduction:
get rid of people on the public payroll and it will all run better.
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Built-in complexity. I have stated above that public-sector management was designed to
be difficult by the founding fathers. Had they wanted efficiency, as equated with speed of
decision making, they would have followed Hamilton's advice; instead we have checks
and balances.
Their alternative, obviously, was to build an organization on a hierarchical, pyramidal
basis. The boss at the top makes decisions and choices, which are passed down and over-
seen by succeeding levels of managers, who are increasingly specialized, to the mass of
those who implement—also layered—down below. 4 To make it work, you have to leave
that top official alone to do the task that has been assigned to him. You have to "get off his
back," to echo a cry widely heard in this country a dozen years ago. You also need a work
force down through the structure that will be compliant and dutiful.
In contrast, look at the position of a public-sector manager at any level. Far from sitting
on the apex of a pyramid—by definition, physically and psychologically a painful spot—
the government officer finds herself placed in the middle of a wheel of power centers,
relatively independent of the person running the program and of each other. Prof. Wallace
S. Sayre of Columbia University first described this phenomenon, relating it to the fed-
eral bureau chief in many writings and speeches. In my view, all public officials, from the
president on down, operate in that type of organizational environment. "In Washington
you can never do anything by yourself," a two-star general told me recently.
Elsewhere I have set forth a categorization of these power centers, aggregating them
under seven headings: the White House (or governor's or mayor's office); the legislature
(or city council); one's own boss; the media; one's own staff; interested nongovernmental
groups; and other government agencies. 5 Obviously, each of these categories includes a
mixed collection of elements that are supportive, opposed, or neutral toward what the
manager in the middle is trying to do. Further, the individual power centers are constantly
forming alliances with each other, using and being used by each other. A woman's staff,
disaffected by what she is doing, capitalizes on their contacts on the Hill or in the press
corps to launch an attack on her. A man from another agency, sensing an encroachment on
his turf, takes his case to the legislature or to the governor's office.
It is this wheel of independent power centers with their ever shifting alliances that has
come to be called the "authorizing environment" of the American public manager. Note
the term environment, rather than authority, because therein lies the great departure from
the common perceptions of how the system works in this country.
Further, the manager has the power, if he wishes to use it, to help shape that authorizing
environment. He need not be passive in the face of it but can be in partnership, albeit
commonly a junior partner.
Since the public manager works in an environment of fractionated power, surrounded
by a collection of independent centers, the process of management and the accomplish-
ment of objectives in the public sector depend upon the manager's skill, not just in persua-
sion, as described in Richard E. Neustadt's seminal work, 6 but in the ability to fashion
programs and policies that attract enough support and neutralize enough opposition so
that something reasonable comes out at the other end. It is a process of compromise,
accommodation, and amalgamation, and it is a very delicate operation indeed. George
Reedy, in analyzing the performance of Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn during their
salad days in the Congress, has said many times that it was precisely this skill, not the
much publicized arm-twisting, that accounted for their success. They were both geniuses,
he observes, at sensing what would work and at fashioning legislation that would garner
the needed support.
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Power, then, is fractionated, and the manager must assemble and reassemble and main-
tain it around each issue as it comes up. It is more than the checks and balances we heard
about from our junior high civics teacher; it is a highly volatile, complex set of shifting
interrelationships, personal and institutional, with which the manager must deal, and it is
different for each policy he is trying to effectuate. To work it successfully, the government
official needs well-developed sensing mechanisms and a special talent for negotiation and
accommodation.
Then there is the matter of interpretation, and the conflicting rights therein. Consider
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Regional Administrator dealing with the re-
quest of the Greater New York Savings Bank to establish a new branch shortly after the
passage of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. 7 The statute mandated that regu-
lated financial institutions have a continuing and affirmative obligation to conduct their
deposit and credit activities so as to meet the convenience and needs of the communities in
which they are located and which they serve. The law requires, further, that these institu-
tions demonstrate they have, in fact, done so. Some neighborhood activists said that
greater New York was not doing "enough," whatever that may have meant; the bank and
its supporters said they were complying with the requirements. This is inevitably a judg-
ment call, not a factual one.
How about the International Trade Commissioner being called upon to decide whether
"an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured by reason of the impor-
tation" of dumped merchandise? What is "an industry"— is it one plant in Colorado mak-
ing square black jellybeans? Or is it the entire candy industry? What does "injured"
mean—the loss of a single potential sale, or a significant reduction of profit and work
force? What does "by reason of" mean—and how do you sort out this variable from ev-
erything else going on in the economy? How "likely" does injury have to be for there to
be likelihood? And so the list goes on, with each interpretation central to a final judgment
that will set a priority on competing claims.
Finally, public-sector jobs are difficult because the facts with which they deal are ex-
traordinarily complex. Take, for example, the much researched history of the feared
swine flu epidemic in 1976. 8 In February of that year, four cases (one fatal, though com-
plicated by other factors) appeared among recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The strain
involved was not the common Victoria flu, but one generally restricted to pigs. None of
the four who contracted the flu had had contact with swine, nor had any of the five hun-
dred men who tested positively for antibodies but never fell ill; so the disease was clearly
passed from human to human. With full awareness of the post-World War I pandemic that
had killed five hundred thousand Americans, policymakers had to decide whether to
launch a nationwide vaccine production and a combined private-public immunization
program as quickly as possible in order to inoculate everyone in the country—not just the
high-risk population—at a cost of $134 million.
In order to make this decision, answers to the following questions, among others, were
required:
1
.
Was an epidemic likely, and, if so, how likely? When he asked that ques-
tion, Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) secretary David Matthews
was told by departmental scientists, "We don't know. The odds are be-
tween 1 percent and 99 percent."
2. Would this be a virulent epidemic? Again, the scientists could not predict,
because they could not assess the power of the virus.
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3. Was the virus spreading at that time, without symptoms being evident? No
one knew.
4. Was this really the World War I virus? The conventional wisdom was that
the postwar outbreak was swine flu, but since methods for identifying
viruses in those days were primitive, no one knew for sure.
5. Since the vaccine would have to be manufactured from chicken eggs, could
enough eggs be produced quickly enough to make enough vaccine?
6. Could some combination of public and private health-delivery systems be
put together quickly enough and efficiently enough to do the job in time,
since immunization does not occur immediately?
7. How would the public and the medical community react to this program?
8. What liabilities would the government and the manufacturers assume?
And so the imponderables piled up, scientific dilemmas for which there were no clear
and incontrovertible data.
This dramatic example is replicated at all levels of government every day. Public offi-
cials constantly have to make judgments in complex matters on the basis of limited eco-
nomic and scientific facts. More often than not, for the public manager, there is no safety
in numbers— in quantifiable information—though there may be considerable help for him
in such analyses.
The Manager as Policymaker
The second premise upon which a realistic educational program should be based is that
policy-making, policy recommendation, and the implementation of policy are inextricably
mixed in any public-sector managerial task. The late Prof. Raymond A. Bauer used to say
that the interrelationship of these elements is more like a spiral ascending in the shape of a
cone than it is a striated pyramid.
This view of the public manager's job flies in the face of a great deal of public adminis-
tration theory going back to 1887, when Woodrow Wilson's famous essay on the subject
was published. 9 Wilson and his successors basically took the position that administration
is a science, clearly distinct from policy-making, and that the process is the same, regard-
less of the context: Czarist Russia, the democratic United States, U.S. Steel, King
Edward's England, and Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany were all managed in fundamentally
the same way, with the same objectives of efficiency and the prudent use of resources.
The making of policy, however, was quite another enterprise.
This notion of a dichotomy between policy-making and policy administering or imple-
menting which Wilson laid out in his article is still extraordinarily alive in the rhetorical
world of the practicing government manager, if not in the operating world, and it appears
and reappears in the pronouncements of elected and appointed officials alike in all juris-
dictions and at all levels of the public sector.
Wilson went on to say that government should adopt what he perceived to be the guiding
principles of business organization: centralization, hierarchy, and discipline. (One cannot
help wondering, people being people, whether business or any other organization ever
really functioned in such a nice, clean fashion, but no matter—this philosophy was and
remains the prevailing view.) Wilson was Hamiltonian in his belief that the messy debates
that characterized his definition of "politics" should be confined to the legislative branch
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and the very highest reaches of the executive. Once policy was set, he thought, it should
be implemented loyally by a skilled, professional group of managers and operators. "Ad-
ministration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not
political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be
suffered to manipulate its offices," he said. 10
The difficulties with this view, and with similar ones espoused by scholars like Profs.
Frank J. Goodnow and William F. Willoughby," lie not in the theoretical concepts but in
the assumption that the real world of the public manager does, could, or should operate
according to the theory. Any empiricist will quickly discover that, in reality, policy-mak-
ing and policy implementing become so "intertwingled," to use an exquisitely descriptive
word coined by one of my children, as to be like the marbling in a marble cake: impos-
sible to separate and, at the margin, very difficult to distinguish.
Furthermore, and this is the more significant point for our purposes, Wilson's thinking
implies, if it did not state, that the government is divided between those who make policy
and those who implement it, that one worker falls into one category and another into the
other. In my view, jobs themselves can, indeed, be divided that way: position X has A per-
cent of policy-making, B percent of policy advising, and C percent of implementing. But
the fact that public officials' responsibilities can be sorted that way does not mean that as
managers people can be classified according to the policy-making/policy implementing
divider (I refer here to the executive branch, of course, not to the legislative); for all man-
agers, from the president on down, perform all three functions.
A host of distinguished political scientists and public administrators have taken serious
issue with the Wilson thesis. 12 To anyone who takes even a casual glance at the day-to-day
life of a government executive, the evidence is so obvious that one would presume no one
would be using this formulation any longer.
Nevertheless, it persists among practitioners (though not scholars) of public administra-
tion. No less an observer and practitioner than former Harvard president James Bryant
Conant, writing his great book about schools in the United States, proclaimed that school
committees and boards should make policy and the career people should implement that
policy. ,3 The chairman of a local board of selectmen will readily tell you that the board
makes policy and the town manager implements it, and that this is the way the world
should be organized. Richard Nixon and his Ash Commission sought to restructure the
government according to this theory; Reagan operatives, from Anne Gorsuch of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to Donald Devine of the Office of Personnel Man-
agement (OPM), trumpeted the distinction at every opportunity and sought to run their
agencies according to their own dictum, incidentally with highly unfortunate results.
The stubbornness with which the concept survives is a tribute to its simplicity and or-
derliness. It appears to make organizations easy to understand and to describe. It con-
forms to a cultural notion in the United States about how things should be done. It
dovetails with the language we use ("my people," "the boss," "the president today or-
dered").
Even more, the concept survives because it serves the interests, periodically, of both
parties. An administrator really appreciates the ability to say to her boss, "You are involv-
ing yourself in administration! You should stick to making policy and let me implement it
for you!" Translation: "You are messing around in my internal politics, procedures, and
independence. Get out, and concern yourself with things I don't care about." I once
served on a school board with an experienced and superbly skillful superintendent. Early
in his tenure, he set us to writing a policy for the Lexington Public Schools. While we
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struggled for months with the distinctions between "and/or" versus "and, or," he ran the
schools unimpeded.
By the same token, the boss's interests are often served by telling off the "pointy-
headed bureaucrats," or at least telling the press and the party faithful that "those civil-
service types think they are running this place; they are trying to make policy around
here! Who elected them to anything? I'm the policymaker!
"
The exact mix of the government manager's job is determined by several factors. Level
in the "hierarchy" is, clearly, one element. No one would dispute that presidents and
governors have a higher proportion of policy-making in their mix than do bureau or sec-
tion chiefs. But this factor is by no means the only determinant. Managers of new pro-
grams or visible ones, often of programs that are controversial; managers whose bosses
are disinterested, or interested in other parts of their jobs; managers who are physically
located away from their supervisors; managers who are cursed with "superiors" who are
dim bulbs or manipulable— all these and more find themselves with a high degree of pol-
icy-making in the amalgam of their day-to-day activities, regardless of the language in
their job descriptions or the writings of public administration theorists. How many city
and town managers, in fact, merely implement legislative or executive policies, despite
the perceptions of those who established the city management movement?
Still other variables that affect the amount of policy-making in the mix are the style and
objectives of the manager herself. Because the system is complex, because the manager
inevitably has some power and can accrete more, an official committed to a point of view,
to a mission and vision for her shop, can increase the proportion of policy-making and
advising and decrease the implementation segment. It is axiomatic that individuals shape
their jobs—that the style and performance vary with the person, that different people with
precisely the same formal job description interpret and define the words in their own
terms. In the public sector, because of the characteristics I have mentioned above, this is
especially true.
The pitfalls and dangers of the policy/administration dichotomy were dramatized by
reminiscences of Carter administration officials who pointed out that President Carter
and his people, believing in the neat distinction between the two, had formulated "policy"
in isolation and had then tried to sell and implement it, instead of recognizing that the
formulation has to be in terms of its managerial and political viability.
Government Jobs as Hunting Licenses
The third premise, like the first two, flows from the nature of our governmental system: a
government job is not a charter but a hunting license, and the public servant who explicitly
recognizes that fact will become more of a partner in the policy-making process, rather
than merely one who implements policy.
I became aware of this characteristic of the public sector some years ago when I put
together a weekend seminar at the Harvard Business School for three groups of business-
men. I chose several businessmen who were then in government, several who had been,
and several who thought they might want to be.
After the first day or so, it was clear that the third group simply was not communicating
with the other two, and vice versa. I could not figure out why they were talking past each
other until suddenly I realized that the people in the group who had never served were con-
ceptualizing a government position as a precise, well-bordered project with clear goals,
objectives, resources, authority, and accountability. The old hands knew, of course, that to
govern is to choose, to assemble power, to negotiate, to accommodate, and to develop strategy.
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Public-sector management is synonymous with making choices among possible policy
initiatives and differing interpretations of commonly vague and infinitely adjustable stat-
utes, regulations, and instructions. The environment of fractionated power enables the
manager, to a degree not understood by the general public or even by many public offi-
cials themselves, to make such choices and make them stick. Colonel North, with what
now appears to have been often vague and quite general "authorization" but with a great
deal of energy and patriotic conviction, was able to piece together power centers inside
and outside the government and make things happen— at least, so the Tower Commission
asserts.
14 This kind of entrepreneurial (or, as some are now calling it, "intrapreneurial")
talent finds a fertile environment in a system of fractionated power.
Which side of the job does an incoming town manager choose to emphasize—procure-
ment, evaluating personnel, developing and working with a corps of community volun-
teers, getting the street department going on potholes, or establishing a power base of his
own so he can be maximally independent of the elected officials? When William Ruckels-
haus first took over the EPA in 1970, he determined that it should downplay its role in the
control of agricultural pesticides and radiation hazards; emphasize clean air and water;
move aggressively in the area of litigation, instead of relying on negotiation and voluntary
compliance; and create maximum independence of action for itself, especially from con-
trol by Richard Nixon and his White House staff. 15 He determined to be highly visible and
proactive, instead of making sure that the scientific groundwork had all been laid. By
contrast, the first administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), with a similar "charter," chose precisely the opposite strategy for his agency.
Thus the amalgam of a fractionated authorizing environment (subject to a degree of
influence and manipulation by the public manager himself), the broad and vague range of
responsibilities, and the general nature of so many statutes and regulations produce a
smorgasbord of opportunities for action. One can pick and choose the dishes that best suit
one's tastes and inclinations.
The reality, then, is that managerial jobs in the public sector are totally different from
the stultifying, mindless, repetitive chores that the public often perceives them to be. It is
true that they can be frustrating; it is true that in comparison to managerial positions in the
private sector, they may require a keener sense of strategy for the purpose of accomplish-
ing an objective. But government people have enormous scope, a large field to play upon,
if they can be helped to see it and to learn the rules.
What Public Managers Need to Know
Given this context—highly challenging jobs with an infinite opportunity to make choices
and judgments—what does the would-be public manager need to know?
Obviously, he needs the tools of analysis; they are essential, given the array of factual
data that must be a part of public decisions. But he needs to be able to do political analyses
of situations, as well as scientific and technical ones. Some economists will tell us that if
you cannot count it, then it is irrational and unpredictable and invulnerable to thoughtful
and planned action. In my experience, however, the politics of a situation, the power rela-
tionships, the constellation of interests and concerns are, in fact, as responsive to analysis
as are the technical facts of the issue. Policy-making is exquisitely Newtonian, and the
occasional reporter who takes the time and trouble to trace a piece of public policy can
show us the "why" as well as the "what."16
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In fact, the successful managers are doing this kind of analysis all the time, albeit al-
most always intuitively, rather than consciously and systematically.
Wheel ofPower Centers
To teach political analysis requires that we return to the model of a wheel of power centers
surrounding the manager. The public manager needs to know more about each of these
power centers and the most effective ways to work with them. The following questions
need to be addressed: What are the dynamics of the legislative process? How and where
can one have an impact upon this process? What is the history of interested nongovern-
mental groups in this country? What are their internal dynamics? When can the manager
work with them? When does the manager have to confront them, and how? What are the
sources of conflict with other agencies, and how can these conflicts be avoided? Or, how
can the manager come out ahead if he can't sidestep the conflict? This would include an
examination of the manager's relationship with the three key specialists with whom he or
she must deal: lawyers, personnel people, and auditors. What are the real, as opposed to
the theoretical, powers of the executive, and, in a nonpyramidal structure, what is the
manager's actual relationship to that executive as one of the power centers with which he
deals? What constitutes a healthy participatory relationship with one's boss, and how does
a manager achieve it? What are the real powers in the hands of those who theoretically
work for the manager, and how can he manage these people in this kind of environment?
What role does the press play, and how does one build an effective strategy for dealing
with it? This, then, is something of a survey course, opening up but clearly not exhausting
the topic, at least exposing the student to the nature of the world in which he or she will
function, and underscoring the importance of understanding and working with these vari-
ous types of power centers.
Managerial Style and Skills
Second, the nature of the environment within which the American public manager func-
tions demands a high talent for the management of people. If this environment were not so
fluid, if it were indeed hierarchical in structure, one could be content and effective with a
direct and authoritarian style. But it is too loose and changeable for that.
Thus, public managers need to be trained to be self-analytical, to understand their own
intuitive managerial style and to be capable of adjusting it when the situation demands
something different.
In this connection, it is highly unfortunate that we have fallen prey to the dichotomy of
"hard" and "soft." Managers, after all, are supposed to be tough. But they are also sup-
posed to be collegial—good listeners, builders of a team of people who have a sense of
ownership in the enterprise. "Management by walking around" tells us that bosses are to
be coordinators, really, responsive to the values and concerns of the workers. But that
sounds soft. Managers should never be that. They should never fail to lead, to follow up,
to make sure that everything is buttoned down and functions with maximum efficiency
and cost-effectiveness.
We carry this simple screen around with us when we view many areas of public policy-
making. One must never be seen as being soft on defense or welfare cheats or criminals or
communism. At the same time, we are told, hard-liners are bad because they are rigid in
their opposition, they are unthinking, and they commonly pick the most violent of solu-
tions, without sensitivity to the nuances.
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In all our wriggling between hard and soft, we have lost track of the true objective: to be
effective. Different people and different situations require different approaches. The
challenge, then, is to teach people to be effective managers and to eschew the irrelevant
polarization. In the words of a recently published book about nuclear policy, there are
hawks and doves—and owls. 17 We ought to be training public managers to be owls.
In addition, flexibility is important—the ability to emphasize different skills in differ-
ent circumstances. Every job in government that I can think of has a standard administra-
tive component, with its emphasis on the timely and efficient use of resources, and a
political/public relations piece, an operational awareness of and responsiveness to the
conflicting concerns of the interested parties. The state of the program and the external
environment establish the maximal mix at any given time.
The history of the development and ultimate elimination of the U.S. effort to build an
SST provides an example. I8 In 1963, construction of such an airplane was basically a
technical, managerial problem; later it became a bureaucratic one, when an oversight
committee under Robert McNamara was established. Finally, in its last days, at the end of
1969, it was a political-public relations tangle, caught up in the mores of "small is beauti-
ful" and environmental protection. It is important, then, for managers in the public sector
to be equipped with a range of skills and with the ability to move along that spectrum in
response to the nature of the problem they face.
The Bargaining Process
Finally, public managers need to be exposed to the growing body of knowledge about the
process of negotiating and bargaining. It stands to reason that things can happen in a non-
hierarchical, fractionated power system only through a process of accommodation. Thus,
a large part of the public manager's life is spent negotiating and bargaining, and only
occasionally in ordering or in confrontation. It is extremely important, consequently, to
understand the process of negotiation, the different circumstances under which it occurs,
the variables involved, and the techniques to be used. What is a zero-sum negotiation, or
one that is not zero-sum? What is the impact of variables like the number of issues on the
table, the number of issues in the background, the time frame, the number of parties,
differing priorities, differing constituencies, personal chemistry, short-term versus long-
term relationships, the perceptions of the onlooking public, the problems of ratification?
What are the ways of handling victory and defeat, and what are the implications of the
different ways?
Conclusion
The public sector in the United States, then, is a unique and special place. Simply lifting
the techniques of planning or performance appraisal or quantitative analysis from the
private sector will not suffice, either in the field or in the classroom.
If one is the manager of a Six Flags Amusement Park, one hammers out a five-year plan
that starts with targets for profits, income, and attendance and is accompanied by state-
ments about the level and categories of investment which one believes will enable the
enterprise to reach those targets. With respect to planning for the museum in the John F.
Kennedy Library, on the other hand— in the public sector—the budgetary process moves
along with very little relationship to agency goals; with no continuity whatsoever; in re-
sponse to nonprogram pressures and external events; and with vast amounts of uncertainty
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from year to year. Without predictable and manageable resources, the term planning takes
on a very special meaning!
The context within which the management function is to be performed, Woodrow
Wilson's comments to the contrary notwithstanding, is all-important for the way in which
people and policies are managed. In structuring programs to educate public managers for
a free society, we need to present material that explicitly investigates that context and the
ways in which it shapes the day-to-day task of the public official. *§)
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